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Essay
Friendage
The Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig*
At the end of the poignant British film "Four Weddings and a
Funeral," actors Hugh Grant and Andie MacDowell are standing
in the rain, embracing. "Marriage and me," he says to her, "are
very clearly not meant for each other. Do you think after we lived
and spent lots more time together, you might agree not to marry
me?" Glistening and with a rapturous smile, she responds, "I do."'
In 1970, according to the Census Bureau, only one out of one
hundred couples living together in the United States was unmar-
ried.2 Today, the ratio is more than six times larger, and an untold
number of other couples are involved in some type of long-term re-
lationship. 3 A highway sign in front of a car repair shop reads
* Judge for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.
1. Four Weddings and a Funeral (Polygram-Rank 1994).
2. The number of unmarried couple households in the United States was 3.5
million in 1993, compared with 523,000 in 1970. See Bureau of the Census, U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 478, Marital Sta-
tus and Living Arrangements: March 1993, at IX, tbl. D (1993) [Marital Status
Report]. An "unmarried-couple household" is composed of two unrelated adults of
the opposite sex who share a housing unit with or without the presence of children
under 15 years old. See id. at VII.
3. The "traditional family" of a working husband, a housewife and children is
no longer the norm in the United States. See District of Columbia Commission on
Domestic Partnership Benefits for D.C. Government Employees, 1 Final Report
and Recommendations 7 (1990). The number of couples that cohabit without en-
tering marriage has increased dramatically over the past 20 years, from 523,000 in
1970 to 3,308,000 in 1992. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Statistical Abstract of the United States 1993, at 54, tbl. 62 (113th ed. 1993). The
classification of nontraditional families includes an increasing number of same-sex
couples. In Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), the Supreme Court of Ha-
waii held that, "although same-sex couples do not have a fundamental privacy
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"Prevent Divorce. Don't Get Married!" Previously married court-
battle scarred veterans are apt to say, "I finally learned how not to
get divorced."4 The well-known astronomical rise in divorces in
this country since World War II5 has had widespread societal ef-
fects, 6 including the increasingly popular decision to eschew the
rite of marriage.7
While the modern trend has been to favor no-fault divorce8 on
the ground that a dysfunctional marriage is unjustifiable and fre-
right to marry under the Hawaii Constitution, the Hawaii marriage statute is pre-
sumptively unconstitutional because it creates a sex-based classification." Steven
K. Homer, Note, Against Marriage, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 505, 507 (1994)
(summarizing Baehr, 852 P.2d 44).
4. It is speculated that divorce has replaced death as the most frequent ter-
minator of marriage. See Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex, and Marriage in Eng-
land 1500-1800 55 (1977). In common law England, the average marriage lasted
20 years. The main causes of termination were death, illness and desertion. Ad-
mittedly, today's longer life-spans and better record-keeping have had an effect on
marriage/divorce statistics. See id. at 46; Kaylah Campos Zelig, Putting Responsi-
bility Back into Marriage: Making a Case for Mandatory Prenuptials, 64 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 1223, 1224 (1993).
5. The divorce rate for non-first marriages now exceeds 50%. Approximately
half of all marriages end in divorce, and the ratio for non-first marriages is even
higher. According to divorce researchers Frank F. Furstenburg, Jr. and Andrew J.
Cherlin, 15% of all children of divorced families will see their custodial parent re-
marry and re-divorce before reaching age 18. See Susan Chira, Struggling to Find
Stability When Divorce is a Pattern, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1995, at 42, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. In 1987, there were 9.9 marriages and 4.8
divorces per 1000 persons in the United States, or nearly one divorce for every two
marriages. See Zelig, supra note 4, at 1223 n.1 (citing U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Services, 3 Vital Statistics of the United States: Marriage and Divorce tbl.
1-1, at 1-5 & tbl. 2-1, at 2-5 (1987)).
6. Some politicians implicate the "breakdown of the family" as the catalyst
for society's ills. See Diana Hochstedt Butler, Romanticizing the Family, Baltimore
Sun, May 26, 1995, at 19A, available in 1995 WL 2444258.
7. Since 1970, the number of unmarried couple households has grown from
523,000 to 3.5 million. See Marital Status Report, supra note 2, at VIII. Changing
sexual mores with respect to premarital relationships has been the main cause of
this steady increase in cohabitating unmarried couples over the past 30 years. See
Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 Va.
L. Rev. 9, 54 n.119 (1990).
8. The trend towards no-fault divorce recognized that many of the "fault"
grounds for divorce were in reality the symptoms of an irreparable breakdown of
the marital relationship. See Joyce Hens Green et al., Dissolution of Marriage
§2.12, at 83 (1986); Max Rheinstein, Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law
(1972); John S. Bradway, The Myth of the Innocent Spouse, 11 Tul. L. Rev. 377, 389
(1937) ("The legislature has declared certain causes for divorce. The medical pro-
fession, the social workers, the psychiatrists, dealing with families, report that the
legislative 'causes' of divorce are only symptoms; that the real causes are such mat-
ters as unemployment, ill health, lack of self control, jealousy, selfishness."). To-
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quently harmful,9 the psychological, social and economic wreckage
that can result from marital breakups is undeniably gargantuan.' 0
Rejected spouses and conflicted children will never be the same
and may need hurtful years just to regroup and start over again. I
Industriously accumulated family nest eggs are sucked down the
familiar drain of lawyers, accountants and mental health
professionals. 12
day, marriage is the functional equivalent of a contract terminable at the will of
either party. See Scott, supra note 7, at 17. Most no-fault divorce statutes require
the complainant spouse to allege the irretrievable disrepair of the marriage. How-
ever, the practical effect of the no-fault system is to grant either spouse a unilat-
eral "right to divorce." Id. at 17 n.23; see also Ira M. Ellman et al., Family Law 203
(1986).
9. It is well-known that children regularly confronted with hostility and an-
ger between their parents may suffer psychological harm. Studies claim that chil-
dren in single-parent homes with a low level of conflict achieve better adjustment
than children in homes comprised of intact families with a high level of conflict.
See Scott, supra note 7, at 32 & n.72; Edythe S. Ellison, Issues Concerning Paren-
tal Harmony and Children's Psychosocial Adjustment, 53 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry
73 (1973); Robert E. Emery & K. Daniel OLeary, Children's Perceptions of Marital
Discord and Behavior Problems of Boys and Girls, 10 J. Abnormal Child Psychol.
11 (1982).
10. The process of going through a divorce is psychologically costly for chil-
dren as well as for the estranged parents. See generally Robert E. Emery, Mar-
riage, Divorce and Children's Adjustment (1988) (reviewing clinical findings
regarding the impact of divorce upon children). In a study of fifth and sixth-grad-
ers in two midwestern cities published last year, Professors Lawrence A. Kurdek,
Mark A. Fine and Ronald J. Sinclair noted that children who experience repeated
divorces earn lower grades and lower approval ratings from their peers. See Chira,
supra note 5. See also Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and
Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony, and Child Support Awards, 28
UCLA L. Rev. 1181 (1981), for a comprehensive study of the economic impact of no-
fault divorce on all family members.
11. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Current Population
Reports, Series P-70, No. 23, Family Disruption and Economic Hardship: The
Short-Run Picture for Children (1991). In 1991, in a nationwide study of 1243
people tracked since 1980, Paul R. Amato of the University of Nebraska and Alan
Booth of Pennsylvania State University found that those subjects who experienced
multiple divorces reported comparatively higher levels of anxiety and depression
as adults and a higher incidence of troubled marriages and divorce rates. See
Chira, supra note 5, at 42.
12. Public costs, such as the use of court facilities, judicial salaries and court
administration, add to the universe of private litigation expense. However, legal
dissolution is a relatively small part of the economic impact of divorce. Divorce
dramatically affects the living standards of children, particularly those in their
mother's primary custody. One researcher reported that mothers average a 73%
decline in their disposable income, while fathers experience a 42% increase after
divorce. See Weitzman, supra note 10, at 1251.
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The not-so-long-ago stigma of divorce has been largely dissi-
pated by the immense increase in volume. 13 Since the advent of
no-fault divorce, the nation's divorce rate has soared over thirty
percent to the point where nearly half of all marriages now dis-
solve.14 Some scholars attribute the epidemic proportions of di-
vorce to a shift in cultural norms.15 But the acute and residual
bitterness, together with the painful and costly destruction
wrought by divorce, is a lesson indelibly visited on the parties and
their progeny. 16 No wonder an alternative to marriage-such as
just not getting married-should seem to be attractive.
Marriage poses interpersonal dynamics problems as well.
There is the clich6 that "[niothing ruins a nice friendship so
quickly and easily." The state's regulation of marriage and di-
vorce, as well as the religious sacrament, was intended to protect
the dependent wife and, in turn, the children. 17 Men were the
13. "The most striking change in this area of family relations is, of course, the
lessened social stigma attached to divorce .... At the turn of the century almost
everyone who divorced was viewed as having lost respectability to some extent,
and from many circles the divorcee was excluded." William J. Goode, World
Revolution and Family Patterns 81 (1963); see also Lenore J. Weitzman, Legal
Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 Cal. L. Rev. 1169, 1203 n.152
(1974) (arguing that society now accepts divorce as "normal").
14. In 1970, approximately one out of every three marriages ended in divorce.
Between 1970 and 1990, the period during which no-fault divorce became the norm
in every state, the divorce rate jumped by 34%. See Louisiana To Make Some Mat-
rimony Bonds Tighter: "Covenant Marriage" First Legislative Success for Pro-
Family Activists, The Milwaukee J. Sentinel, June 25, 1997, at 8, available in 1997
WL 4805559.
15. One writer asserts that marriage is now viewed by many as a "nonbinding
commitment." Carl Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of Ameri-
can Family Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1810 (1985). The widespread acceptance
of no-fault divorce exemplifies the "doctrine of nonbinding commitments." Id. (cit-
ing Nena & George O'Neill, quoted in Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcis-
sism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations (1978)). Ergo, a
marriage should be sustained only if it "works," attributing the increase in divorce
to changed societal attitudes. See id. at 1842. Schneider argues that the primary
motivating force of individuals in modem society has become self-realization and
personal well-being, rather than fulfillment of moral and religious duty. See id. at
1845.
16. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
17. In the early Middle Ages, marriage implied a private contract between two
families that included a property exchange and provided some financial protection
to the bride in the event of the death of her husband, or his desertion. See Stone,
supra note 4, at 30-31. Under common law in England, numerous legal restraints
were placed upon married women. Upon marriage, the wife's personal property
and possessions became the property of her husband and upon his death passed to
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bread-winners and the movers-and-shakers; women raised fami-
lies.1 s With the advent of egalitarian feminism and the political
and economic emergence of women, 19 the age-old idea of female de-
pendency became subservient to partnership equality.20
Yet, the legal status of marriage and the difficulties of resolv-
ing the issues of divorce-alimony, support, child custody, division
of property and counsel fees-may shift the balance of psychologi-
cal power in the marital relationship and produce untoward and
his personal representatives. A husband was entitled to his wife's wages. If a
married couple separated, then the husband would gain custody of the children.
Also, a woman could not contract in her own name, either with her husband or
with third parties. See Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the
United States §8.1, at 499-500 (2d ed. 1988). The inferior legal position of women
was remedied by the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts, the first of
which was enacted in 1839 in Mississippi. See Leo Kanowitz, Women and the Law:
The Unfinished Revolution 40 (1969); Weitzman, supra note 13.
18. Blackstone noted: "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in
law .... [Tihe very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband." 1
William Blackstone, Commentaries *442. Under the common law doctrine of cov-
erture, the husband and wife merged into a single legal identity, that of the hus-
band. The traditional roles of husband and wife assumed that the husband was
solely responsible for support of the family. See id.; see also, e.g., Carlson v. Carl-
son, 256 P.2d 249, 250 (Ariz. 1953) ("The law imposes upon the husband the bur-
den and obligation of the support, maintenance and care of the family and almost
of necessity he must have the right of choice of the situs of the home.").
19. Married women now constitute 60% of the female labor force. See Employ-
ment Standards Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Women Workers Today 2 (1971).
Over 20 million married women work and contribute to the support of their fami-
lies. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, The Statistical Abstract of
the U.S. 222-23 (1974). According to one author, husbands are the dominant
bread-winners in less than 50% of blue-collar marriages, producing an egalitarian
gender ethic in most of those families. See Mirra Komarovsky, Blue-Collar Mar-
riage 223 (1964).
20. Several courts, dissatisfied with the inherent inequities in the traditional
common law concepts of marital property, now view marriage as an economic part-
nership. See John De Witt Gregory et al., Understanding Family Law §3.08, at 64-
65 (1993) (noting a trend towards this economic partnership view). This concept,
based on principles of shared ownership of property during marriage, is embedded
in community property law and is incorporated into the Uniform Marital Property
Act. It has influenced the development of equitable distribution of property in
common law states, although these states still retain the principle of individual
property rights. See id.; see also Report of the Committee on Civil and Political
Rights to the President's Commission on the Status of Women (1963) (concluding
that during marriage each spouse should have a legal right to the earnings of the
other spouse, including property purchased from their earnings, and such a right
should continue to be legally recognized in the event of annulment, divorce or
death), quoted in Prefatory Note, Unif. Marital Property Act, 9A U.L.A. 97 (1987).
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unanticipated consequences. There is the story about the affluent
husband who wanted to give his wife a special present for her 50th
birthday-"A big party? A five-carat diamond ring? A trip around
the world?" he asked. "No, I don't think so," she said. "I want a
divorce!" "Oh," he said, "I couldn't afford anything that expensive."
And the more commonplace sequelae is the loss of romance and the
decrease in regard for one's mate, if not oneself, that can degener-
ate into desperate boredom and distastefulness, and much worse.
Marriage can turn into bondage.
Divorce as a panacea may engender as many problems as it
resolves, as evidenced both historically and by recent develop-
ments in family law. Until this century, divorce was uncommon. 21
Viewing marriage as a permanent union, the courts granted a di-
vorce only upon proof of certain legislatively defined transgressions
or incapacities. 22 Restive societal changes began with World War I
and were accelerated by World War II. Couples, with the guidance
of counsel, learned how to manipulate the fault-based divorce sys-
tem by perjuring themselves or colluding in order to obtain marital
freedom. 23 As society began to regard marriage as a partnership
between individuals, the movement in favor of no-fault divorce
gained momentum. 24 Between 1969 and 1985, all of the states had
enacted no-fault divorce laws. 25
Advocates of no-fault divorce argued that, by removing fault as
an obstacle to consensual divorce, the law was brought into con-
formity with practice. 26 However, the no-fault system proved to be
21. See Scott, supra note 7, at 15.
22. For example, in 1822, Rhode Island granted a divorce for "impotency,
adultery, extreme cruelty, wilful desertion for five years... [or] neglect or refusal
... of the husband, being of sufficient ability, to provide necessaries for the subsis-
tence of his wife." Rev. Stats. R.I., 368-69 (1822) (current version at R.I. Gen. Laws
§15-5-2 (1956) (1996 Reenactment)).
23. The fault-based divorce laws required couples to prove that one party was
innocent while the other was guilty. In order to satisfy the law's strictures, one
spouse would often testify falsely to create an appearance of the other's fault. See
Zelig, supra note 4, at 1225.
24. See Laura Bradford, Note, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent
Proposals to Reform No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 607, 613 (1997).
25. See id. at 614. See generally Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Di-
rections in Divorce Reform, in Divorce Reform at the Crossroads (Stephen D.
Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
26. See Bradford, supra note 24. In the 1960s, courts granted 90% of all di-
vorces based on a fault ground without contest, and hearings were brief and per-
fumctory. For example, it was reported that in New York the proceeding had
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no less problematic than its predecessor. Critics allege that it has
had catastrophic effects on women and children. In tandem with
the no-fault movement, many states adopted equitable distribution
statutes,2 7 designed to treat spouses as legal partners.28 However,
this mechanism, which calls for a division of the parties' marital
property upon divorce,29 tends to penalize the spouse-still almost
always the wife in a long-term marriage-who has foregone a pro-
fessional degree or career to care for the family.30 Typically, the
"dependent" spouse has not developed marketable skills during
child-rearing years. Furthermore, there continues to be an earn-
ings inequality in the workplace.3 ' The combination of these fac-
tors usually leaves the "dependent" spouse at a considerable
economic disadvantage during and after the dissolution of the
marriage.32
become such a formality that the average divorce hearing rarely lasted more than
15 minutes. See Scott, supra note 7, at 16 n.18.
27. See Diane Green Smith, Note, "Til Success Do Us Part: How Illinois Pro-
motes Inequities in Property Distribution Pursuant to Divorce by Excluding Profes-
sional Goodwill, 26 J. Marshall L. Rev. 147, 157 (1992).
28. The goal of equitable distribution is to distribute marital property upon
divorce in an equal manner, regardless of who holds title. See Joseph W. Mc-
Knight, Defining Property Subject to Division at Divorce, 23 Fain. L.Q. 193, 201-05
(1989).
29. See In re Marriage of Lee, 398 N.E.2d 126, 133 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); In re
Marriage of Slauson, 562 P.2d 604, 607 (Or. Ct. App. 1977); see also Robert J. Levy,
An Introduction to Divorce Property Issues, 23 Farn. L.Q. 147, 151-52 (1989).
30. Some courts have recognized services as a homemaker as economic contri-
butions. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Aschwanden, 411 N.E.2d 238, 242 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979) (holding that the wife's contributions as a homemaker are a factor in the
division of marital property). However, most courts are unwilling to include intan-
gible property (e.g., professional degrees or enhanced earning capacity) as part of
the marital estate subject to division. See Bradford, supra note 24, at 616; see also,
e.g., In re Marriage of Zells, 572 N.E.2d 944 (Ill. 1991) (holding that a business
interest is not part of marital property subject to distribution if it consists of pro-
fessional goodwill).
31. In a recent Census Report, the average weekly salary of a white male was
$497, while that of white females was $243. The average weekly salary of a black
male was $339, while that of black females was $205. See Bureau of the Census,
United States Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 410
(1990).
32. See Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault
Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 20-21 (1987). One writer states
that over half of all women who were former homemakers earn incomes at or below
poverty level. See Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Dis-
course on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-
Fault, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 67, 79 (1993).
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In response to dissatisfaction with the no-fault system, at least
nine states are considering proposals to repeal or modify their di-
vorce laws.33 In July 1997, the Louisiana legislature adopted a
law re-establishing a more binding form of marital status, one that
permits divorce only in narrow circumstances such as adultery,
abuse, abandonment, a lengthy marital separation or imprison-
ment for a felony. 34 This status, known as "covenant marriage," is
not subject to no-fault divorce. Its proponents hope that it will
make wedding vows more meaningful and divorce less likely.35
Requirements for termination mirror the once prevalent fault-
based laws. While the strengthening of marriage and return to
fault-based divorce may be viewed as a commendable develop-
ment,36 it is also bound to be controversial, and will no doubt fo-
ment an increased antipathy to marriage. Given the number of
couples who have already chosen the avoidance of marriage as a
33. See Bradford, supra note 24, at 636 n.91 (stating that Georgia, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington and West Vir-
ginia are considering legislation which would repeal no-fault divorce, while the
state legislatures in Alaska, Iowa and Maryland are considering other divorce im-
pediments). In Michigan, State Representative Jessie Dalman has proposed a se-
ries of bills designed to strengthen the institution of marriage. Representative
Dalman's scheme would make it harder both to get married and to obtain a di-
vorce. See id. at 618-19. Couples seeking a marriage license would have to com-
plete a program in premarital counseling or wait 30 days and pay an extra $80 for
the marriage license. Fault requirements would apply to spouses unilaterally
seeking a divorce. All divorcing couples with children would face additional re-
strictions. See Michael J. McManus, State of the Union Laws Need a Complete
Overhaul, Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Feb. 18, 1996, at 8, available in 1996 WL
5523667.
34. Couples choosing a covenant marriage pledge to enter upon matrimony
only after serious consideration. They agree to try to resolve potential marital con-
flicts through counseling if either spouse requests it and to seek divorce only by a
mutually agreed upon two-year separation or under other limited circumstances.
See Amitai Etzioni, Marriage Covenant Allows Couples to Reject Too-Easy Divorce,
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 20, 1997, at 7B, available in 1997 WL 3361116.
35. See Jon Jeter, Upping the Marriage Ante: Louisiana Covenant Marriage
Option Makes Breaking Up Much Harder to Do, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Aug. 17,
1997, available in 1997 WL 11839574.
36. Louisiana State Representative Tony Perkins, the sponsor of the covenant
marriage legislation, in a national television appearance, stated that "Itihe first
thing we're trying to do is to kind of turn the culture of divorce that has been
created over the last 25 years to a culture of marriage." See CBS This Morning
(CBS television broadcast, July 7, 1997), available in 1997 WL 5627539.
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societal arrangement, it is worthwhile to explore that alternative
further, amorphous as it may be at the present time.37
From almost every standpoint, coupling without marriage is a
dimly lit, uncertain relationship.38 The question voiced by Hugh
Grant-Would you "agree not to marry me?"39-leaves open a
huge unstructured set of legal, economic and psychological pos-
sibilities.40 Thinking about it leads into areas of the law such as
partnership and joint ventures.4 1 Also, like "Marriage," it needs
its own name: "Friendage."42
As defined for hundreds of years, a legal partnership is created
when persons put together their money, goods, labor and skill to
carry on an enterprise in which there is a community of interest.43
37. In the 1960s, when it became obsolete, the fault system was believed by
many to be out of step with modem family life. The Archbishop of Canterbury's
Group, for example, noted that divorce based on fault "no longer represented wise
legal or social policy." Kay, supra note 25, at 7.
38. Common-law marriage is a nonceremonially-created status that requires a
"positive mutual agreement, permanent and exclusive of all others, to enter into a
marriage relationship, cohabitation sufficient to warrant a fulfillment of necessary
relationship of man and wife, and an assumption of marital duties and obliga-
tions." Black's Law Dictionary 277 (6th ed. 1990). Currently, only 13 states and
the District of Columbia recognize common-law marriages. See 1 Homer H. Clark,
Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States §2.4, at 101 (2d ed. 1987).
When faced with disputes arising out of informal relationships, courts have taken
a "functional" approach. See Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More
Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances,
92 Colum. L. Rev. 1164, 1169 (1992). The courts examine the characteristics of a
particular relationship and attempt to protect the reasonable expectations of the
parties. See id.
39. Supra note 1 and accompanying text.
40. See William A. Reppy, Jr., Property and Support Rights of Unmarried Co-
habitants: A Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 La. L. Rev. 1677 (1984);
Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Property Rights Arising from Relationship of Couple
Cohabiting Without Marriage, 3 A.L.R.4th 13 (1981).
41. "[Olur society has undergone profound transformations in the past cen-
tury, and the long-standing legal structure of marriage may now be anachronistic.
The state's interest in preserving the traditional family may not be important
enough to offset new societal and individual needs which require more flexibility
and choice in family forms." Weitzman, supra note 13, at 1170.
42. At present, the law refers to unmarried coupling by the somewhat pejora-
tive rubric of "cohabitation"-and to the parties as "cohabitants." See supra note
38. Since labels can be important, the neologism of"Friendage" is suggested as an
attractive correlative of "Marriage."
43. A partnership is defined as "an association of two or more persons to carry
on as co-owners a business for profit." Unif. Partnership Act §6 (amended 1994), 6
U.L.A. 256 (1995). The official comment to the Uniform Partnership Act states:
"Ownership involves the power of ultimate control. To state that partners are co-
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Ordinarily, such a partnership is commercial and is focused on eco-
nomic profit. A joint venture is a form of partnership, usually ar-
ranged for a limited purpose." Like any contract, a partnership
agreement need not be in writing but a written agreement is
highly desirable. It forces the parties to think conscientiously
about their relationship and is much clearer and easier to prove
than conversation. It should contain provisions on the nature of
the relationship, the parties' contributions, their rights and duties,
the term of the partnership, dispute resolution and dissolution-as
well as any other pertinent areas.45 So long as the means and
objectives do not violate public policy, no impediment exists which
would prevent two persons from joining together in a social
partnership. 46
Friendage agreements should resemble business partnership
agreements-and to a substantial extent would be just as enforcea-
ble in a court of law. All of the important areas of the friendage
relationship could be covered. Ante-nuptial agreements are well-
known in the law but have usually been confined to property mat-
owners of a business is to state that they each have the power of ultimate control."
Id. cmt. (1); see also Harold G. Reuschlin & William A. Gregory, The Law of Agency
and Partnership §175, at 250 (1990).
44. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §491 cmt. c (1965) (defining the concept
of joint enterprise through the use of four elements: (1) an agreement, express or
implied; (2) a common purpose; (3) a pecuniary purpose; and (4) an equal right of
control); see also Walter H. E. Jaeger, Partnership or Joint Venture?, 37 Notre
Dame Law. 138 (1961) (discussing the circumstances under which certain business
associations are considered either joint ventures or partnerships). See generally
Walter H. E. Jaeger, Joint Ventures: Membership, Types and Termination, 9 Am.
U. L. Rev. 111 (1960) (examining the rights and duties of the participants in a joint
venture; the necessity of a contract between the joining parties; the various forma-
tions of the joint venture; and under what circumstances it will be terminated).
45. The benefits of a clearly defined agreement that outlined the duties of the
spouses during marriage and provided for the disposition of their property upon
death or divorce were recognized by well-to-do British families in the seventeenth
century, when marriage contracts were the rule. See Stone, supra note 4, at 30-31.
46. At common law, a partnership agreement between a husband and wife
was invalid because of the woman's lack of contractual capacity. See, e.g., In re
Bowles, 15 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Ky. 1936) (holding that the wife, while married,
lacked the ability to contract with her husband). However, in the wake of statutes
that enlarged the rights of women, several courts have upheld the validity of part-
nership agreements between a husband and wife. See Ian F.G. Baxter, Marital
Property §37:1-:2, 589-91 (1973). For example, in a Pennsylvania case, the court
stated: "There can be no doubt that under existing law in this state a husband and
wife may be partners in a business. Any previously existing incapacity of a mar-
ried woman to contract in this respect has been removed by statute." Northampton
Brewery Corp. v. Lande, 10 A.2d 583, 584 (Pa. Super. 1939).
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ters where an economic disparity and often an age difference exists
between the parties. 47 At one time, courts refused to enforce con-
tractual provisions regarding future support obligations,48 and
they are still reluctant to implement provisions that regulate an
ongoing marriage.49 Judicial reticence in this area arose as the
consequence of societal notions of the traditional family. 50 While
marriage is an ancient institution, friendage entails the making of
a private agreement based on open communication and rational
decisionmaking. The parties to a friendage agreement, having
carefully negotiated its terms, would anticipate being bound by
them. Provisions in a friendage agreement could encompass a
47. Agreements made by married couples providing for property division, sup-
port obligations or child custody in the event of divorce usually are enforceable if
made after the couple has decided to separate. See, e.g., Graham v. Graham, 33 F.
Supp. 936, 940 (E.D. Mich. 1940). Until recently, such agreements made prior to
or during marriage, when the couple had no intention of separating, have gener-
ally been held unenforceable. See Weitzman, supra note 13, at 1263; cf. Restate-
ment of Contracts § 586 (1932) ("A bargain to obtain a divorce or the effect of which
is to facilitate a divorce is illegal."). See generally Charles W. Gamble, The Ante-
nuptial Contract, 26 U. Miami L. Rev. 692 (1972) (advocating increased use and
enforcement of antenuptial contracts); Homer H. Clark, Jr., Antenuptial Contracts,
50 U. Colo. L. Rev. 141 (1979) (same).
48. Courts usually treat premarital contracts differently from ordinary con-
tracts for three reasons: (1) their unusual subject matter, (2) the confidential rela-
tionship of the parties to the agreement and (3) the possibility of enforcement in
the distant future. See Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements,
40 Rutgers L. Rev. 1059, 1061 (1988). In 1983, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Premarital Agreement
Act in order to clarify existing law. See Laura P. Graham, Comment, The Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act and Modern Social Policy: The Enforceability of Pre-
marital Agreements Regulating the Ongoing Marriage, 28 Wake Forest L. Rev.
1037, 1038 (1993).
49. Judges were concerned that "interference" during an ongoing marriage
may exacerbate conflict between the parties, give rise to difficult enforcement
problems and frustrate judicial economy. See Graham, supra note 48, at 1043;
Clark, supra note 47, at 161.
50. See Graham, supra note 48, at 1040. The fictional unity of husband and
wife at common law produced barriers to premarital contracts. As the "head of the
household," id. at 1041 & n.33 (quoting William Blackstone, Commentaries 445
(1813)), a husband was obligated to provide for his family. Therefore, courts would
not enforce premarital agreement provisions that attempted to alter or eliminate
the support obligations of the parties. In addition, a wife was obligated to render
"services in the home" without compensation. Id. (quoting Joan M. Krauskopf &
Rhonda C. Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and Ineq-
uitable Law of Support, 35 Ohio St. L.J. 558, 567 (1974)). Courts invalidated
agreements to the contrary on public policy grounds. See, e.g., Ritchie v. White, 35
S.E.2d 414 (N.C. 1945) (holding that the public policy of the state imposed a duty
of support on the husband).
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wide variety of subject matters, without having to deal with many
of the historical public policy issues that encumbered premarital
agreements.
A friendage agreement should be comprehensive, and its for-
mation would best be facilitated by a professional with legal and
perhaps family therapy credentials. The parties to the agreement
could provide for careers, children, lifestyles, as well as economics
and a myriad of other issues after thoughtful and sensitive consid-
eration. In contrast to what happens when anger and mistrust
have tyrannized the relationship, good sense has a much better
chance at the outset while good feelings and a desire to reach
agreement prevail. 51
Essential to the idea of friendage is thoughtful planning for
the future. One law and psychology professor, Elizabeth S. Scott,
advocates the use of "precommitment strategies" as a self-manage-
ment technique for partners considering a long-term relation-
ship.52 She hypothesizes that parties in a long-term relationship,
at least implicitly, share a mutual goal-to maintain that union.53
Given that frequent short-term pressures and strains may debili-
tate even a robust relationship, she recommends the use of precom-
mitment planning to help the parties achieve their long-term
goals.54 Some of her suggestions are economic sanctions for re-
51. Psychologists emphasize the importance of communication in marriage,
which would apply with equal vigor to friendage. See Patricia Noller, A Longitudi-
nal Study of Conflict in Early Marriage, 11 J. Soc. & Pers. Relationships 233, 249-
50 (1994). The need for a pragmatic approach is also essential to a lasting
relationship.
Perhaps one of the clearest requirements for a successful romantic rela-
tionship is that it be based on a foundation of realism. This is the ability
and willingness to see our partner as he or she is, with shortcomings as
well as virtues, rather than attempting to carry on a romance with a
fantasy.
Nathaniel Branden, The Psychology of Romantic Love: What Love Is, Why Love Is
Born, Why It Sometimes Grows, Why It Sometimes Dies 131 (1980).
52. See Scott, supra note 7, at 40-44; see also R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Incon-
sistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 Rev. Econ. Stud. 165 (1955-56).
53. See Scott, supra note 7, at 42 (recommending the use of precommitment
planning to preclude future options that reflect short-term preferences). Precom-
mitment planning strategy acknowledges the reality that stresses, such as career
conflicts over children and lifestyles, and changing interests and pursuits, may
threaten the stability of a long-term relationship. See id.
54. See id. at 43. Professor Scott also recommends informal arrangements.
"[Tlhey may agree to rules against [destabilizing] behavior ... (flirting, adultery),
[or to] rules promoting resolution of problems (never go to bed angry)." Id.
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proachable conduct, mandatory "cooling off' periods and, where
marriage is contemplated, a comprehensive prenuptial agreement.
These strategies encourage careful decision-making about entering
into a long-term relationship, and foster cooperative behavior
thereafter. 55 As a fundamental approach to friendage, the parties
should agree on their substantive goals and the procedures for dis-
pute resolution.
As between the parties, marriage in the law is a contract made
by the exchange of statements of intention in the present tense;56
however, marriage differs from most contractual arrangements in
that it is a status governed by state statute.57 Ordinarily, the par-
ties are oblivious to the contractual nature of their commitment. 58
In contrast-and in lieu of the generic and numbly taken vows of
ceremonial marriage-the friendage agreement would be the re-
sult of heartfelt and head-reasoned negotiation. 59 The institution
of marriage could also greatly benefit from such an enlightened
and analytical precommitment process.60
55. A mandatory delay would discourage impulsive decision-making and allow
an opportunity for reconciliation. See id. at 44.
56. See, e.g., Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936, 938 (E.D. Mich. 1940)
("[Miarriage is not merely a private contract between the parties, but creates a
status in which the state is vitally interested and under which certain rights and
duties incident to the relationship come into being, irrespective of the wishes of the
parties.").
57. See Weitzman, supra note 13, at 1170.
58. The idea of a contract within marriage will strike many as incongru-
ous, for marriage is typically thought of as the most intimate and private
social relationship, while a contract is typically regarded as the prototype
of rational business transactions. And yet, upon closer examination, it
will become clear that there is an implicit contract that governs every
marriage-an unwritten contract that is imposed by law.
Lenore J. Weitzman, The Marriage Contract: Spouses, Lovers, and the Law xv
(1981).
59. Similarly, one of the major benefits of negotiating a prenuptial agreement
is that the parties are compelled to think about the potential sources of disagree-
ment before, rather than after, the fact. See Allison A. Marston, Note, Planning for
Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 887, 895 (1997);
Judith Schoolman, Advice for Newlyweds: Keep Some Finances Single, Reuter's
Bus. Rep., Feb. 25, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
60. Advocates of prenuptial agreements argue that the process of negotiating
before entering marriage can save the couple from a disastrous breakup. See Mar-
ston, supra note 59, at 894. Contracts require the parties to think about the obli-
gations they are about to undertake before they become spouses or parents. See
Weitzman, supra note 58, at 353. Moreover, there is less room for misunderstand-
ing when each other's expectations have been discussed and reduced to a written
agreement. See id. Many agencies, such as the Catholic and Episcopal churches,
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Another area of the law offers a further analogy, the law of
property. In the usual marriage ceremony, the words "until death
do us part" have a hollow, almost cruel ring, given the statistics to
the contrary.6 1 The ceremonial implication is that of fee simple
ownership, and one of the stereotypical complaints about marriage
is, "He thinks he owns me," or "She now owns everything we
have!"6 2 It is almost as though the professed charade of perma-
nency is a counter-productive self-fulfilling prophecy of divorce-a
forbidden fruit, as it were, which tempts or impels one or both
spouses.
In this era of increasing transience, both in time and geogra-
phy, it may be much more realistic to utilize the law of leasing. A
term of years, with renewal options, might accentuate the parties'
attention span and alert them to each other's and their own
needs.63 And if, as it happens, the needs of one or both change so
drastically that their friendage must come to an end, then the psy-
chological and economic devastation of divorce may at least be re-
duced-and their children's suffering humanely dealt with by prior
offer various types of premarital counseling. See Siona Carpenter, Tying a Strong
Knot, The New Orleans Times-Picayune, Aug. 12, 1997, at F1, available in 1997
WL 12660233.
61. See supra note 5.
62. Common law states adhere to a 'title theory" of property, allocating own-
ership to the spouse who holds title to the asset in question. The owner of property
may manage, control and dispose of the asset without the consent of, or notice to,
the other spouse. See Gregory et al., supra note 20, §3.03, at 54. The Uniform
Marital Property Act (UMPA), promulgated in 1983, incorporates the partnership
concept of marriage. The UMPA is based on principles of shared property owner-
ship during marriage, and is generally regarded as a community property law.
The UMPA provides for a dual classification system of a married couple's property,
which categorizes property as either marital property or individual property. Each
spouse has a present undivided one-half interest in marital property. All property
of spouses is presumed to be marital property, as is income from any source. Indi-
vidual property consists of property acquired prior to marriage and property ob-
tained during marriage by gift or inheritance from a third party. See id. §3.07, at
62-63. However, increases in the value of individual property during the marriage
are also considered to be marital property.
63. According to sociological data, the present average duration of a marriage
that ends in divorce is 10 years. The average time period before separation is eight
years. See Thomas P. Monahan, When Married Couples Part: Statistical Trends
and Relationships in Divorce, 27 Am. Soc. Rev. 625 (1962). These figures suggest
that the notion that a marriage (or a friendage) will "last a lifetime" is statistically
unrealistic. See Weitzman, supra note 13, at 1204.
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planning.64 Breakups would still be painful, but by comparison
with divorce, less damaging and much shorter in duration and,
hopefully, kept out of court. A final and binding arbitration-of-dis-
putes provision would be a private, economical and expeditious
way to avoid the harrowing trek through the court system.65
Many lawyers have a healthy respect for the interests of chil-
dren and do not enjoy leading their clients down the litigation path
in an acrimonious divorce. 66 Nowadays, they often bring in ther-
apists and clinicians to deal with their clients' agonizing problems.
Mediation is much more preferable to the adversary system.67
Lawyers recognize that, in divorce and child custody proceedings,
there are no winners.68 Judges find family court to be the most
frustrating and unrewarding of judicial assignments. Friendage,
while it would create a new set of problems-such as palimony,
64. Today, as the result of increasing divorce rates and more liberal divorce
laws, some courts have abandoned their paternalistic concerns for the enforcement
of premarital agreements as to property division or child support issues. See supra
note 47. Also see Hill v. Hill, 142 P.2d 417, 422 (Cal. 1943) ("[P]ublic policy does
not discourage divorce where the relations between husband and wife are such
that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been utterly destroyed.").
65. The movement toward nonadversarial divorce has increased the use of ex-
trajudicial dispute resolution methods such as arbitration and mediation. "Arbi-
tration is a method of dispute resolution which is invoked on the parties'
agreement to provide a solution or remedy when the parties are deadlocked on an
issue arising in negotiation, mediation, or enforcement of a separation agreement
or divorce decree." Green et al., supra note 8, §5.02, at 186. Advantages include:
(1) the existence of an arbitration clause may serve as a deterrent to using the
process; (2) the hearings are private and informal and (3) the arbitration process is
usually much faster than the court system and more cost-efficient. A disadvantage
is that arbitrators are not necessarily bound by the same principles of substantive
law that apply to the courts. Therefore, ordinary judicial protections are not avail-
able. See id. §5.03, at 189-90.
66. See Joseph Goldstein et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (2d ed.
1979) (stating that the primary emphasis of the court's inquiry in custody litiga-
tion should be the relationship, in particular the psychological relationship, be-
tween the parents and children.)
67. Divorce mediation encourages spouses to solve their own problems and de-
termine the parameters of their agreement, thereby avoiding traditional divorce
battles. See generally Linda J. Silberman, Professional Responsibility Problems of
Diuorce Mediation, 16 Fam. L.Q. 107, 135 (1982) (arguing that ethical concerns can
be resolved within the structure of the divorce mediation programs).
68. One lawyer-psychologist commented that he often hears divorcing clients
say, "[ilf I had known that this was going to be so awful (difficult, expensive, psy-
chologically stressful) I never would have done it." Scott, supra note 7, at 49 n.108
(quoting Remarks of Charles Ewing, Professor of Law, State University of New
York-Buffalo, Law-Psychology Colloquium (May 6, 1988)).
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community property issues and the attendant problems of the
friendage agreement itself-should also go a long way to reduce
the rigidities and complexities of marriage dissolution.
As previously suggested, the best way to enter into a friendage
agreement will be to work through all the contemplated issues of
the relationship and to agree on a methodology of problem resolu-
tion.69 Precommitment strategies can promote choices that rein-
force the original commitment and discourage behavior and
decisions that are inconsistent with a long-term commitment. 70
Professional assistance can be very helpful and may often be essen-
tial. It is hoped that the status of "Friendage" will be a great boon
to millions of people in our society and, perhaps, as a form of a
commitment process, to "Marriage" as well.
69. Cf. Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 732 (Colo. 1982) (rejecting the ar-
gument that antenuptial agreements violate public policy because such planning
protects the financial expectations of the parties, thereby enhancing marital stabil-
ity). Volid v. Volid, 286 N.E.2d 42, 46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (suggesting that a con-
tract may promote marital stability if it defines each party's expectations and
responsibilities); Unander v. Unander, 506 P.2d 719, 720 (Or. 1973) (overruling
previous holding that agreements which provide for no alimony encourage divorce
because there was no validity to this promise); Studies suggest that divorce plan-
ning provisions in premarital agreements promote marital stability by defining the
expectations and responsibilities of the parties. See Gregory et al., supra note 20,
§4.02, at 82.
70. See Scott, supra note 7, at 43.
